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CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ROBERT B. MCKAY*
T HE PRACTICE OF LAW IS A DEMANDING DISCIPLINE. It is no simple mat-
ter to represent a client competently and responsibly. The twin
obligations of undivided loyalty to the client and uncompromising can-
dor to the court impose severe strains upon the lawyer who does not
comprehend the linkage between those seemingly conflicting obligations.
Resolution of the sometimes clashing responsibilities to client and court
are often not knowable intuitively. Careful training is essential for proper
performance in a competent and responsible manner. If these observa-
tions seem little more than truisms today, it has not always been so. The
notion that university training for lawyer competence might be
necessary or even desirable is largely a product of the last century.
Before that, lawyer training was largely in the hands of the profession
in various forms of more or less successful apprenticeship programs. In-
deed, for a number of years, beginning with the Jacksonian period of
highly individualized democracy, no training of any kind was required of
those who asserted willingness to give legal advice.
With the rise of the university law schools, apprenticeship as a
substitute for formal legal education all but disappeared, and even the
occasional state requirements for apprentice training as a supplement to
law school education ultimately were abandoned nearly everywhere. As
the law schools became the nearly exclusive arbiters of who could enter
the profession, they perfected techniques of imparting analytical skills
to their students. The goal came to be epitomized in that mystifying
expression, "to think like a lawyer." Law students did indeed become
very good at finding the ratio decidendi of opinions and distinguishing
one appellate result from another.
Despite these highly refined techniques for communicating analytical
skills, something was lost in the process. Law schools and law pro-
fessors, many of whom had little or no practical experience, asserted
that the teaching of analytical skills was not only a proper province of
the law schools, but the only thing that law schools should attempt.
What we would now call skills training was to be provided elsewhere, in
apprenticeship programs (mostly unsuccessful), in office instruction, or
in actual experience (one suspects sometimes at client expense).
Law schools performed their self-assigned tasks with increasing skill
and mounting self-confidence that they had correctly defined the limits
of their role. At least until the 1960's, there were surprisingly few com-
plaints from the bar or the students. But, interestingly, as the law
students became increasingly well qualified to perform the exacting
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tasks imposed by the analytical methodology, they also become increas-
ingly critical about the absence of skills training as a significant part of
legal education. Moreover, law firms, always ready to fault the academic
establishment, claimed that their new associates, concededly bright and
energetic, were not immediately useful because they did not understand
the pragmatic aspects of practice or, in the jargon, "They couldn't find
the courthouse door."
However exaggerated the claim of deficiencies in legal education,
there was some truth to the complaint. To their credit, the law schools
responded, especially when financially attractive grants became avail-
able for educational experimentation in skills training-particularly in
clinical legal education.
In considering the future, it is initially instructive to look at history
and current incentives for change. These include not only a new aware-
ness of student concerns, but also a new perception of the improved
prospects for more comprehensive programs of legal education. The
principal vehicle for change has been the clinical legal studies program,
now an integral part of the education program of most American law
schools.
American legal education seems at last to have accepted the proposi-
tion that preparation for the practice of law does not consist exclusively
of analysis of appellate decisions. As the American Bar Association's
Task Force on Lawyer Competency has noted, lawyer competence
demands a wide range of lawyering skills, including the ability to: 1)
analyze legal problems; 2) perform legal research; 3) collect and sort
facts; 4) write effectively- both in general and in a variety of specialized
lawyer applications such as pleadings, opinion letters, briefs, contracts,
wills, and legislation; 5) communicate orally with effectiveness in a
variety of settings; 6) perform important lawyer tasks calling on both
communication and interpersonal skills such as interviewing, counsel-
ing, and negotiation; and 7) organize and manage legal work.'
As to clinical legal education, perhaps the important fact is that it is
alive and well, at least for the moment. The vital question is this: How
will clinical legal studies survive after the demise of the Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc. (CLEPR) at the
end of 1980, likely reduction or elimination of federal grants for clinical
legal education, and general budget tightening because of rising costs?
In seeking to answer that ultimate question, several preliminary ques-
tions arise. First, has clinical legal education proved its educational
worth? (My answer is affirmative.) Second, assuming an affirmative
answer to the question of worth, is clinical legal education affordable?
(Again, my answer is affirmative.)
Before considering these threshold questions, it is appropriate to
recall the history of the development of clinical legal education in the
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United States. Until the late 1950's the only clinical legal studies pro-
grams were in those few schools that opened legal clinics, mostly before
1950, for the combined purpose of providing some needed legal service
to persons who could not afford to pay conventional lawyer fees, and to
offer skills training to law students. Those programs were limited to a
few schools, including Duke, Tennessee and New York University, and
were not widely copied.
The more general spread of clinical legal studies did not take place
until the 1960's and 1970's. The original thrust occurred in 1959 when the
Ford Foundation established an experiment in clinical legal education
known as the National Council on Legal Clinics (NCLC). Between 1959
and 1965 NCLC funded nineteen experimental programs with over
500,000 dollars. Their success provided the basis for further grants from
the Ford Foundation (more than ten million dollars through 1980) that
established the viability of the clinical legal studies concept. The
ultimate recipient and dispenser of those funds was the Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility. During its life, from
1965 to 1980, it provided funds for experimental programs of clinical
legal education in most American law schools. The response was over-
whelmingly positive. Traditional schools, "elite" schools and practice-
minded schools found the programs relevant and useful-at least so
long as financial support was available from CLEPR and, more recently,
from the federal government.
Training for competence is now recognized as a proper part of legal
education, even when defined to include instruction in such lawyer skills
as interviewing, counseling, negotiation and trial advocacy. This is the
message of the report issued by the Task Force on Lawyer Competency
of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, which
strongly endorsed skills training in law school.2 Since the most readily
accessible route to skills training is through clinical legal studies, the
question remains: Can law schools afford clinical legal education?
If such training is a proper and essential ingredient of legal education,
the answer must of course be affirmative. But the question remains:
What, if anything, must be given up if clinical education is to be con-
tinued?
The issue has been put in its most acute form with the termination of
CLEPR and its grants program. Moreover, the likelihood of federal
grants in support of clinical legal studies appears to be a diminishing
possibility. It is therefore unhappily appropriate to assume that neither
private nor public funding will be available to most law schools as they
reappraise their allocation of budget funds during an inevitably more
stressful financial future. In short, does clinical legal education meet the
test of necessity?
2 ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY, THE ROLE OF THE LAW
SCHOOLS 8 (1979).
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An affirmative answer is here suggested for the following reasons.
First, skills training is an important adjunct to analytical training and is
nowhere better provided than in appropriately designed clinical pro-
grams. Second, neither students nor prospective employers should be
satisfied with a legal education that omits reference to the practical
world of skills training. Third, contrary to the common belief of earlier
generations, skills training can be better accomplished through the
systematic training programs of the law schools than through the more
haphazard training of law firms and other law offices.
Finally, there are a number of positive signs that clinical legal educa-
tion has achieved permanent status in the law school world: 1) Nearly all
law schools have one or more clinical programs that are typically over-
subscribed. The AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS lists more than
700 teachers of clinical subjects; 3 2) The REPORT OF THE AALS/ABA
COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION endorses
the clinical concept and suggests various ways of incorporating clinics
into the legal education apparatus;' 3) The bureaucracy of the legal
education apparatus has accepted clinical education. The AALS has ap-
proved both a Standing Committee on Clinical Education and a Section
of Clinical Education, both of which are active in programming, training
and publication. The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar has more recently reactivated its Clinical Legal Education
Committee, also with a promise of continuing financial support; and 4)
The California Bar Examiners have experimented with a performance
test of advocacy skills.' If validated, this could well be the precursor of
other certification programs that would demand proficiency in skills
training as a precondition for admission to the bar.
It is still too early to predict the exact shape of clinical legal studies
in the law school curriculum; but the strong indications are that it will
survive, even after the demise of CLEPR, and even without other exter-
nal funding, simply because it is right.
I ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
1980-81, at 959-64 (1979).
' See AALS/ABA COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCA-
TION, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1979).
' See Letter from Kenneth McClosky, Director of Examination to Committee
of Bar Examiners of the State of California (July 9, 1979) (California Committee of
Bar Examiners' Study on the relationship between alternative measures of
lawyering competencies).
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